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This paper demonstrates that strategic equity holdings by employees and family or by 
corporations discourage investment in environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
activities as measured by ASSET4 performance scores. Conversely, debt or government 
equity finance is positively associated with ESG scores. The results are based on a large, 
recent and international sample and are generally consistent across conventional pooled 
cross-sectional and time-series regression models and propensity score matching 
experimental techniques. However the regression results for investment institutions are 
inconsistent with those from propensity score matching. The paper adds to our 
understanding of investor influence over firm management in general, over governance 
and environmental and social performance in particular and the way in which 
institutional arrangements might stimulate ESG investment. 
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Investor Influence on Firms’ Environmental, Social and Governance 
Performance. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the impact of strategic equity holdings and debt finance on 
ASSET4’s assessment of the environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance 
of firms. Whilst corporate social responsibility has been much studied there is little 
evidence concerning the factors that encourage or hinder environmental, social and 
governance investment (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). This paper takes the view that 
climate change, the failure of corporate governance contributing to the financial crisis 
and problems with the ethical approach of firms and wealth inequalities, particularly in 
developing economies, all point to the importance of corporate social responsibility in 
general and ESG in particular.  Whilst the costs attributable to ESG investment may be 
presumed to fall on the firm and its owners, the benefits may largely fall on other 
stakeholder, including employees, customers, firms, society and the state. This could lead 
to underinvestment in ESG, at least as perceived by stakeholders other than investors. If 
so, an understanding of those factors which impact on ESG investment, here assumed to 
be reflected in ESG scores, may be important. 
 
The sample consists of 19,360 firm/years drawn from 2002-2010 for 58 countries, 
mainly representing developed economies. For each case we match the social, 
environmental and governance scores provided by ASSET4 with debt and equity 
strategic holdings available from Worldscope together with financial controls and firm 
characteristics. The ESG scores, used as the dependent variable, no doubt measure 
underlying ESG performance with error. However, ASSET4 scores are positively and 
significantly associated with similar scores that are available from FTSE4Good and it is 
not obvious why any error in the ESG scores would be systematically associated with the 
independent variables. Equally, the strategic equity holdings recorded by Worldscope 
may measure equity holdings with error but the analysis is largely based on simply 
identifying those firms that have large i.e. greater than 10% holdings.  
 
It is not obvious what the best measure of strategic equity holdings should be. The 
analysis assumes that, for example, employee/family or investment institutions’ equity 
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holdings are best measured as the total for each category. It is certainly quite possible 
that members of a family, or like-minded institutions, will act in concert or simply have 
the same incentives and constraints. It is also possible that a measure of the total family 
equity holding is a misleading measure. For that reason much of the analysis is based on 
a simple categorisation: does the firm have a substantial equity holding, designated as a 
strategic equity holding, attributable to a type of shareholder? Thus the analysis 
investigates whether firms with large government equity holdings, or substantial leverage, 
act differently from those with substantial family or corporate cross-holdings.  
 
The first results are based on conventional regression techniques where the social, 
environmental or governance score is modelled against the test variable identifying the 
source of finance and a set of control variables accounting for industry, country, 
profitability and market-to-book. The analysis is conducted on the full sample and sub-
samples classified as liberal market economies (LMEs) or coordinated market economies 
(CMEs). The results are based on two measures of strategic equity holdings and its 
components. The variables are expressed both as percentages of equity and dummy 
variables identifying significant holdings. The results are largely consistent: entrenched 
equity holders from corporations or employees/family are associated with lower ESG 
scores whilst government or debt finance is associated with higher scores. 
 
Additional results are derived from propensity score matching (PSM) approach that 
attempts to resolve the causal difficulty inherent in conventional regression modelling 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). If the regression model apparently demonstrates that an 
independent variable, X, is significantly associated with the outcome variable, Y, this may 
be because both X and Y are “caused” by Z. It is only under particular circumstances 
that including Z on the right hand side will fix this problem (Armstrong et al. 2009). 
Instead PSM models the probability that a particular case will be treated i.e. X=1 
assuming a zero-one categorisation, and matches cases with similar probabilities of X=1, 
where one case is treated and the other not. The difference in the outcome variable, Y, 
can then be assessed. In the main our results based on PSM are consistent with the 
regression models. However, the regression models suggest that investment institution 
equity holdings are associated with lower ESG scores, especially in liberal market 
economies. This result cannot be replicated using PSM, which suggests that institutional 
block holdings are not significantly associated with ESG scores. 
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This study adds to a limited set of recent, and mostly still developing, research papers 
that attempt to explain what affects ESG performance in firms (Barnea and Rubin (2010, 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010, Mackenzie and Rees, 2011). These papers have focused on 
institutional and/or international dimensions and have incorporated financing largely as a 
marginal item of interest. The results in prior research relevant to financing are also 
inconsistent, particularly with regards to debt finance. This study focuses on financing 
and controls for international and institutional issues. The underlying assumption is that 
managers are sympathetic to ESG investment but investors may not be, particularly if 
undiversified (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Whilst the results are particular to the ESG 
investment context they also shed light on the real impact that ownership structure can 
have on managerial decision-making. The paper also makes use of propensity score 
matching. This is a useful technique when applied to natural experiments but has not 
been extensively employed in business research to date. 
 
The results robustly indicate that corporate and employee/family equity holdings tend to 
be associated with lower ESG scores whereas debt and government equity holdings are 
associated with higher scores. Evidence with regards to strategic equity holdings by 
institutional investors and pension funds is inconclusive, which is consistent with 
diversified strategic equity holders behaving similarly to diversified investors without 
strategic holdings. Given the large impact financing attributes appear to have on ESG 
performance scores, the implications for policy makers intending to promote ESG 
investment are potentially important. 
 
The paper firstly sets out the background and prior research including sections on the 
ESG rating process, prior research on ESG and hypothesis development based on that 
prior research. The research method is then outlined, followed by the results and 
conclusion. 
 
2. Background and Prior Research 
 
2.1 ESG ratings 
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ASSET4 is one of a growing set of ESG ratings organisations. For some time Kinder, 
Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) have been providing an assessment of the CSR 
performance of US firms. FTSE4Good have also been categorising firms as complying 
or not with ESG criteria to become listed in their index since 2002, and since 2010 they 
calculate a performance score based on six categories for each of the environmental, 
social and governance pillars. Despite some early scepticism the organisations have 
gradually refined their techniques and have gained some credibility in the financial and 
investment world (Collinson et al. 2009, Slager, 2009, Slager et al. 2012). In most cases 
financial institutions are closely involved in the development of the scoring systems. 
ASSET4, now a part of the Thomson Reuters conglomerate, have been publishing their 
scores since 2002. They calculate four scores: the usual environmental, social and 
governance scores plus an economic score. The economic score is based on client 
loyalty, performance and shareholder loyalty. Environmental performance incorporates 
resource reduction, emission reduction and product innovation. Social performance 
includes employment quality, health and safety, training and development, diversity, 
human rights, community and product responsibility. Corporate governance is assessed 
on board structure, compensation policy, board functions, shareholder rights and vision 
and strategy. ASSET4 report that these scores are based on 250 indicators calculated 
from 750 publicly available data items. 
 
As with all such scoring systems it is difficult to tell to what extent the score measures 
genuine CSR activity and to what extent that CSR activity benefits stakeholders. 
Mackenzie and Rees (2011) note that in 2010 the FTSE4Good and ASSET4 scores are 
significantly positively correlated. This is consistent with two expert systems evaluating 
the same underlying phenomena. They report the scores for five dimensions but where 
like is being compared with like the raw correlations are marginally over 0.50. Some of 
the remaining disagreement will be explained by explicit differences in the scoring system 
– FTSE4Good downgrade firms exposed to high risk whereas ASSET4 do not. 
However, there is a significant level of agreement between the two sets of scores. 
 
There is also some limited American evidence suggesting that ESG scores reflect an 
underlying reality and impact on performance. Chatterji et al. (2009) relate a KLD 
assessment of 588 firms’ environmental performance and demonstrate that this related to 
past environmental events such as toxic emissions, environmentally related fines etc. The 
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score appears to be a better assessment of past than future performance. However, 
Chatterji and Toffel (2010) have also demonstrated that poor KLD environmental scores 
have stimulated firms to improve their toxic emissions faster than firms that scored well. 
Thus there is some preliminary evidence that ESG scores can reflect an underlying reality 
and can lead to genuine benefits. There is some way to go before we can conclude that 
these benefits are pervasive. 
 
Much of the analysis of ESG scoring systems and the related socially responsible 
investment indices has concentrated on the link between financial performance and ESG 
scores or index membership. If ESG investment is costly we might expect firms with 
high levels of performance to have lower profitability or growth. A case has been made 
above that investment in environmental and social management and good governance 
has a positive impact on performance. Yet it is not clear why over or under financial 
performance should necessarily lead to better performance (McWilliams and Siegal, 
2001) or thence to abnormal returns, unless the market has collectively misunderstood 
the implications. In general the results are weak and mixed (Margolis et al., 2007, 
Renneboog et al. 2008). It is safe to conclude that as yet we have little robust evidence on 
the relationship between ESG scores and financial performance.  
 
2.2 Explanations of ESG performance. 
 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) analyse 2,292 US firms that are categorised as socially 
responsible or irresponsible in 2003 by KLD and conclude that leverage and inside 
ownership inhibit corporate social responsibility. The analysis is constrained by a blunt 
two-way graduation of CSR and by a sample limited to the US but it is influential as one 
of the first papers to try and explain differences in CSR across firms. It is also useful for 
the development of the thesis that managers will prefer to invest in CSR for the “warm-
glow” effect, and that investors with influence will attempt to constrain that impulse.  
 
International studies of ESG performance include Ioannou and Serafeim (2010) based 
on ASSET4 data and Mackenzie and Rees (2011) using FTSE4Good. In the first paper 
the authors are primarily interested in the institutional factors and in a pooled cross-
section and time-series analysis (7 years and an average 1,827 firms per year) with year 
and industry effects they incorporate 35 characteristics. These include leverage and 
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closely held stock as explanatory variables. The first is insignificant and the second is 
significantly negative, although it is not clear whether the estimation technique has 
reliably controlled for the clustered error terms inherent in a pooled time-series and 
cross-sectional model. Whilst the model attempts to capture country differences it does 
so indirectly and given that financing characteristics differ considerably across national 
boundaries any result on financing may be mixed with international differences.  Finally, 
closely held stock includes types of investors who may encourage ESG and others who 
will resist it, so the Ioannou and Serafeim (2010) result will necessarily measure the net 
effect. The paper is focused on international institutional differences, and hence does not 
focus on investors, but the significant negative impact on closely-held stock is indicative 
that the structure of equity investors may be important. In the second paper Mackenzie 
and Rees (2011) use one cross-section of 1,825 internationally diverse firms in 2010. 
Their analysis is based on FTSE4Good 6 point classification of ESG. They examine 
country characteristics specifically examining the thesis that open societies stimulate ESG 
investment. However, they also analyse investor characteristics and conclude that 
entrenched undiversified owners resist ESG investment and, contrary to earlier results, 
tentatively suggest that leverage is positively associated with ESG scores. 
 
Mackenzie et al. (2011) show how financial institutions may influence CSR practices in 
their analysis of the impact of FTSE4Good engagement on firms in danger of being 
deleted from the FTSE4Good index when the environmental management criteria were 
upgraded. This represents a more pervasive style of engagement than the apparently 
effective, but more localised, direct contact documented in Becht et al. (2009). Mackenzie 
et al. conclude that for an international sample of firms FTSE4Good engagement 
significantly increased the probability of meeting the new criteria when implemented in 
2005. They report that they examined the influence of financial controls including 
ownership but found no effect. They do report a strong positive effect on firms that 
would expect to be in the FTSE4Good index and also that their results are robust to the 
choice between regression models and propensity score matching. 
 
The evidence that ownership structure influences ESG practices is limited to a few 
papers. For the US (Barnea and Rubin 2010), evidence suggests that leverage and insider 
ownership have a negative effect. For international results Ionnou and Serafeim (2011) 
report no effect for leverage and a tentative negative effect for closely held stock, whilst 
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Mackenzie and Rees (2011) suggest a positive impact for leverage and a negative impact 
for entrenched undiversified equity. All of these studies use linear regression models 
rather than propensity score matching. 
 
An alternative approach, taken by Cox et al. (2004), is to examine the impact of CSR 
performance on the demand for equity from different categories of investors. Their 
evidence suggests that for a UK sample of FTSE All-Share index constituents during 
2002-3 long-term investors, pension funds and life assurance firms tend to invest in firms 
with high CSR ranks but charities, short-term investors, investment trusts and unit trusts 
do not. Although based on UK data only this suggests that the direction of causality is 
not obvious and that the link between CSR and investment institutions may be complex. 
However, whilst credible for investment institutions this result has no obvious link to 
corporations, employees and family or government who drive the key conclusions in the 
results presented below.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses. 
 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) assume that managers are well disposed towards CSR 
investment due to the “warm-glow effect”, but Mackenzie and Rees (2011) also point out 
that it is tempting to acquiesce to the demand of stakeholders seeking CSR investment 
and that a reputation as a responsible manager may benefit managers’ careers. Barnea 
and Rubin argue that insider ownership may either permit insiders to “promote non-value 
maximising activities” as they are strong enough to resist pressure of other investors to 
prioritise wealth maximisation or alternatively they may resist such investment as it will 
be personally costly. In our study we are able to identify groupings of strategic equity 
holdings that are likely to have an incentive to maximise wealth, such as employees and 
family owners and others that may be less focused on wealth maximisation, such as the 
government. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between strategic equity holdings and ESG scores of firms. 
 
However, some investors will be more diversified than others. Lyndeberg (2007) argues 
that narrowly rational investors will oppose ESG investment. Where investors realise that 
the external benefits from ESG investment may be captured by other firms in their 
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portfolio investors will be more accepting of ESG investment. Finally, the “universal 
investor”, normally characterised as pension funds (Kierman, 2007), or alternatively 
sovereign wealth funds (Gjessing and Syse, 2007), appreciate that they have a long-term 
investment in society so any external benefits, even those that do not fall immediately on 
the remainder of their portfolio, is welcome (Hawley and Williams (2007). That apart, a 
diversified investor may have less incentive to incur the monitoring and supervision costs 
associated with tempering managers’ inclination to incur ESG investment. Government 
held equity could also justifiably be used to encourage ESG investment. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Less diversified investors, employee/family or corporations will exhibit a stronger negative 
relationship with the ESG score of firms than other strategic equity holders, and government strategic 
holdings will be least negatively or positively associated with ESG scores of firms. 
 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) also suggest that funds from debt holders could either provide 
the surplus cash needed to invest in negative NPV ESG investment or conversley the 
monitoring activities of debt holders will prevent wealth destroying ESG investment. 
They expect the latter case to be the stronger. However, debt holders are interested in 
the security of interest and capital, which will only be directly related to wealth 
maximising activities in circumstances that threaten a company’s survival. Indeed risky, 
but wealth increasing investments, may be against debt holders interests. Thus funds 
provided by debt holders could replace funds from wealth maximising equity holders and 
reduce the constraints on ESG investment.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative or positive relationship between leverage and firms’ ESG scores. 
 
Campbell (2007) suggests that there is a complex set of economic and institutional 
factors that will affect a firm’s enthusiasm for ESG investment. Many of these relate to 
the competitive environment, industrial and institutional norms and government activity 
that is impossible to measure for individual firms and difficult for countries. However, 
the “varieties of capitalism” approach presents a simple dichotomy between liberal 
market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) that captures 
many of the differences suggested by Campbell (Hall and Soskice 2003). More recently 
authors have developed more sophisticated divisions of countries. In particular Kang and 
Moon (2012) analyse of the impact of government on CSR and further divide CMEs into 
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those which can be characterised as state-led and others. However, this requires 
knowledge of each country to determine the classification and the analysis presented here 
retains the original dichotomy. As LMEs tend to be countries with high levels of equity 
market capitalisation to GDP and are typically characterised as having legal systems 
based on common law the LME versus CME dichotomy is consistent with the 
mainstream of accounting and finance theory. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of leverage and strategically held equity will differ between liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies. 
 
 
3. Research Method 
 
3.1 Regression models 
 
The initial results are based on a pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample of 
international firms where country and industry differences are accounted for by including 
the sample averages of the dependent variable for those dimensions and the statistical 
significance tests incorporate adjustment for errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 
2008). The results are robust to alternative model specifications and definitions of the 
control variables. In equation one the test variables are the percentage of strategic equity 
holdings and the leverage calculated as the sample decile of debt over equity plus debt. 
Control variables are a) deciles of return on equity b) deciles of the market value of 
equity plus debt over book value of equity plus debt c) mean ESG performance scores 
by country and d) mean ESG performance scores by industry. As the model is estimated 
as a pooled cross-section and time-series standard errors are corrected for clustering by 
firm and year. 
 
Equation 1a 
Scoreit = a0 + a1SEHit + a2LEVit + a3ROEit + a4FMBit + a5Cit + a6Iit + eit 
 
The model has been tested in a number of different specifications. Scoreit is one of the 
social, environmental or governance scores provided by ASSET4 for firm i year t. This 
variable is a score from zero to 100. The strategic equity holding variable SEHit is the 
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Worldscope measure of strategic holdings, which ranges from 0 to 100. The leverage 
variable LEVit is expressed in deciles to avoid the need to trim outliers. The results are 
robust to using the raw data if outliers are removed. The underlying leverage variable has 
been calculated as total debt over total debt plus equity, long-term debt to long-term debt 
plus equity and total debt over total debt plus the market value of equity and the results 
are robust to the alternatives. Return on equity, ROEit, also expressed as a decile, was 
replaced by return on assets with no clear impact on the results. Firm market to book, 
FMBit, is calculated as debt plus market value of equity over debt plus equity and is 
intended to measure growth opportunities. Alternatives were run using market value to 
book of equity and deciles of predicted long run growth of earnings from IBES analysts. 
The central results remained unchanged. The country, Cit, and industry, Iit, means were 
also replaced by dummy variables identify each industry and country. Again there was no 
substantive change to the test results. In each case the most effective control variables 
were employed – measured by statistical significance – with the exception of predicted 
long run growth, which is a more powerful control variable but was only available for 
approximate three-quarters of the sample. Again the test results were unchanged when 
this control was employed. 
 
Equation 1b 
Scoreit = a0 + a11CORit + a12EMPit + a13GOVit + a14INVit + a15PENit + a16OTHit +… 
a2LEVit + a3ROEit + a4TQit + a5Cit + a6Iit + eit 
 
In the second version of equation one the strategic equity holding variable is 
decomposed into its six elements identifying corporate cross-holdings, CORit, employee 
of family holdings, EMPit, government equity holdings, GOVit, investment institutions, 
INVit, pension fund holdings, PENit, and unclassified holdings, OTHit. The leverage and 
control variables are unchanged. 
 
Equation 1a and 1b are estimated in an alternative format where the test variables are 
zero-one dummies where one represents firms with 20% strategic equity shareholdings, 
or 10% block holdings in any of the components of SEH, or firms falling in the top 20% 
of leverage. 
 
3.2 Propensity Score Matching. 
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Equation two is used to estimate a probability that a firm will be identified as receiving 
treatment i.e. categorized as having high leverage, or strategic equity holdings or any of 
its components.  In equation 2 TRTit represents the zero-one variable where one 
indicates that the case receives treatment and zero that it does not. The control variables 
for leverage, return on equity and firm market to book are calculated as in equation one. 
The year, country and industry variables are a vector of dummies identifying each firm’s 
membership of each category. The equation is estimated as a probit model. In this case 
the results for probit or logit estimation are virtually indistinguishable. 
 
Equation 2 
TRTit = b0 +b2LEVit + b3ROEit + b4FMBit + Σy.YRit + Σc.COit + Σi.INDit + eit 
 
The cases that received treatment, i.e. TRTit equals one, are then matched with a case, or 
a sample of cases, that did not receive treatment but where the probability of being 
classified as treated is approximately similar, defined as  pr(TRT),Y ≈ pr(TRT),N, where 
pr(PRT) is the predicted value from equation two. The treatment effect is then the 
difference in Scoreit between the two cases. There are a number of ways in which cases 
may be matched and the statistical significance of the treatment effect estimated 
(Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). The results reported in this paper are based on the 
simplest approach where firms are matched with their nearest neighbour by pr(TRT), 
with replacement, and using the normal T-test of difference between two matched 
samples (Leuvan and Sianesi, 2010). This implies that an untreated case can be matched 
with more than one treated case but obviously no case will include the same matched 
pair. The T-test also makes no allowance for the fact that the matching probabilities are 
estimated.  
 
Matching was also conducted using a group of neighbours, n=3 and n=5, with and 
without replacement, and matching within a radius of probabilities (r=0.001, r=0.005). A 
bootstrapping approach was also used to compute alternative tests of significance. The 
tests were not sensitive to different matching approaches but were sensitive to 
bootstrapping alternatives in 6 out of 72 tests. Three applied to the unclassified equity 
holding which is not tested as part of any hypothesis. Two implied significance that was 
not suggested by the regression model and only one out of six disputed cases suggested 
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that an apparently statistically significant result was in fact not significant. All six cases 
are identified in the results. 
 
 
4. Results. 
 
4.1 Sample Description. 
 
The sample is derived from 20,146 firm/years from 2002 to 2010 for which ESG scores 
are available from ASSET4, ranging from 961 cases in 2002 to 3353 in 2009. Of these 
strategic equity holding data is available for 19,726 cases and financial variables, including 
market capitalisation, are available for 19,588 cases. When the datasets are combined we 
are left with a sample of 19,360.  These are split between 11,670 cases based in countries 
classified as LMEs and 7,690 in CMEs. The distribution of cases across countries and 
industries is given in the appendices 1 and 2 together with the classification of countries 
into the two designations.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the test variables are given in table 1. As a) the ESG scores and 
equity ownership variables range from 0 to 100, b) the financial control variables are 
incorporated in the model as deciles, and c) the country and industry variables are 
averages of the original ESG scores, the table doesn’t contain extreme values. It is clear 
that the countries and, to a lesser extent, industries explain considerable diversity in ESG 
scores. Strategic equity holdings, averaging 26.7 percent, are largely composed of 
holdings by investment institutions (11.2%), corporate cross-holdings (8.2%), and 
employee/family holdings (3.4%), but in all categories there are some firms which are 
classified as having over 90 strategic holdings. As the financial deciles are uninformative 
appendix 3 contains means and medians for each decile. 
 
Table one about here. 
 
The cross-correlations of all the variables used in the analysis are given in table 2. Firm 
measures of environmental and social performance are highly correlated at 0.749 but 
corporate governance has a relatively low correlation with the other two at 0.141 and 
0.302 respectively. The ESG scores are reasonably highly correlated with the country or 
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industry averages but it is only for country level governance that the correlation exceeds 
0.5 at 0.769. Otherwise the ESG scores have modest correlations with other variables, 
the highest being governance, correlating at 0.298 with institutional investment, 
negatively -0.292 with corporate cross-holdings and positively 0.226 with firm level 
market to book. As would be expected total strategic equity holdings correlate positively 
with its components and return on equity correlates positively (0.428) with firm market 
to book. 
 
Table two about here. 
 
4.2 Regression models of total strategic equity holdings and debt. 
 
Table 3 contains the results from pooled time-series and cross-sectional models of the 
ESG scores from 2002 to 2010 for the full sample and the sample split between LME 
and CME countries. The test variables are for the strategic equity holding expressed as a 
percentage of total equity (SEH) and leverage calculated as the deciles of total debt over 
total debt to equity (LEV). The control variables for profitability (ROE), industry 
averages (IND) and country averages (CTY) are always statistically significant, and firm 
market to book is always negative, save for corporate governance for LME firms, but 
only statistically significant for social and environmental scores for CME firms. The 
explanatory power of the models is in the range 16% to 19% for the social score, 16% to 
23% for the environmental score and 32% to 61% for the governance score.  
 
Table three about here. 
 
We see that for all models the slope coefficient on the strategic equity holdings are 
significantly negative whilst those on gearing are significantly positive. As hypothesised 
our initial results strongly support the case that equity block holdings tend to discourage 
ESG investment. The impact on the social and environmental score is significantly 
stronger in LME countries whereas that for governance appears to be consistent across 
the two samples. However, we expect the components of strategic equity holdings to 
have different impacts on ESG scores. The distribution of these components differs 
between LME and CME countries. It would be potentially misleading to conclude at this 
stage that the economic system is influential without further analysis. The hypothesis 
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regarding the impact of debt holdings did not specify whether a positive or negative 
impact would be found, but only that it may be significant. It appears that high debt 
levels are associated with high ESG scores, which is inconsistent with Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) but consistent with Mackenzie and Rees (2011). There is no statistically significant 
difference between the impact of debt across the two sub-samples. 
 
Table four about here. 
 
In table 4 the analysis is repeated with a dummy identifying strategic equity holding of 
greater than 20% and a dummy identifying the highest 20% of leverage scores for the 
sample. The results for the SEH are entirely consistent with the previous results and the 
SEH coefficient is significantly negative for all models. However, whilst the leverage 
dummy coefficient is positive in all cases it is not significantly so for either of the sub-
samples for governance nor for the social score model for CME firms. This suggests that 
the impact of debt is less clear-cut than that for equity and this is investigated later. 
 
  
4.2 Regression models of classified strategic equity holdings and debt. 
 
The hypotheses regarding segmentations of the strategic equity holdings are that 
entrenched block holders, such as other companies and employees/family, will strongly 
resist ESG investment, governmental block holdings will support ESG investment and 
that the expected impact of diversified shareholder, pension funds and investment 
institutions is unclear. The results show that corporate block holdings have a negative 
impact on social, environmental and governance scores for the full and LME samples 
and a negative impact on all ESG scores for the CME sample, but only significantly so 
for governance.  The employee/family result is even stronger with a significant negative 
coefficient observed for all three categories on the full and both sub-samples.  
 
Table five about here. 
 
Conversely, government block holdings have a significant positive impact on social and 
environmental scores for all three samples, a significant positive impact for the 
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governance score in LMEs and insignificant positive impacts for governance in CMEs 
and in the full sample. 
 
The regression model results for investment trusts and pension funds appear initially 
intriguing. Investment institution holdings have a negative impact on the full sample 
results for social, environmental and governance scores but this is driven by the LME 
sample. The influence of investment institutions on the CMEs is apparently trivial. 
Conversely, pension fund holdings impact significantly negatively for social, 
environmental and governance scores for CMEs but only for governance for LMEs and 
for the full sample. 
 
However, when percentage strategic holdings are replaced by dummies indicating 10 
percent holdings or greater the results appear somewhat more robust. For all models of 
social, environmental and governance scores corporate cross-holdings are significantly 
negative as are employee/family block holdings. The government block holding dummy 
is significantly positive for all models save for governance scores in CMEs, and that only 
fails conventional significance tests by a whisker. However, when using dummy rather 
than continuous variables we again find that investment institutions’ holdings are 
associated with reduced ESG investment for the full sample and the LME sample 
whereas pension fund holdings are significantly negative for the full sample and the 
CME sample. 
 
Table six about here. 
 
Thus the regression models are consistent with the second hypothesis. They confirm that 
there are clear differences between the impact of different types of strategic equity 
holdings with the presumably undiversified corporate and employee/family holdings 
strongly associated with lower ESG scores and government holdings with higher ESG 
scores. The impact of institutional investors, both pensions and investment institutions, 
remains unclear, although generally negative, with the results fluctuating between 
economic regimes. This is considered later. 
 
4.2 Propensity score matched analysis of block holdings impact on ESG. 
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The results from propensity score matching strongly confirm three important results. 
Firstly, employee/family block holdings are significantly associated with reduced social, 
environmental and governance scores for the full sample and both sub-samples. The 
impact of “treatment” is estimated at similar levels across all samples, and indeed across 
all three ESG measures. Firms where employees or family collectively own 10% or more 
of equity score approximately 10 points lower on the ASSET4 scores. Secondly, where 
the government has a block holding this is significantly positive for social, environmental 
and governance scores in all cases save for governance in CMEs, which has a positive 
but insignificant effect. The effect is the strongest of our estimates and the results 
suggest a 16-point improvement where government has a block holding for social and 
environmental scores and 5 points for governance. Thirdly the impact of debt holdings is 
consistently and significantly positive on all three measures of ESG and for all three 
samples. 
 
Table seven about here 
 
The propensity scores also support the earlier analysis for the impact of pension fund 
holdings. These are significantly negative for the full sample but only because they are 
also significantly negative for the firms located in CMEs. Indeed the scores for 
environment and social performance are positive in the LMEs. Whilst interesting, and 
worthy of further investigation, these results are based on only 78 out of 11,670 LME 
firm/years and 86 out of 7,690 CME firm/years having pension fund holdings recorded 
as greater than 10%. 
 
In one further instance the propensity score results are supportive but not identical to 
the regression models. For corporate holdings the regression results were consistently 
significant and negative across all nine tests where dummies were used and for seven of 
the nine tests where continuous measures of strategic holdings were used. The impacts 
on social and environmental scores in CMEs were negative but not significant. When 
using matching techniques we again estimate seven significantly negative results and two 
negative and insignificant results for social and environmental scores in LMEs. The 
overall result is clear. Corporate cross-holdings are generally negatively associated with 
ESG scores but given the instability across the different estimation techniques it is 
conservative to draw no further conclusions. 
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Finally, we have one clear dispute between the regression model results and those from 
propensity score matching. The regression models with continuous variables showed 
significant negative results for all three scores at the full sample level and for social and 
environmental for the LME firms. All other estimates were negative and insignificant. 
When using dummy variables to identify equity holdings the results were significantly 
negative for all three scores for the full sample and LME firms but insignificantly 
positive for all three measures for CME firms. The results from propensity score 
matching are more equivocal with negative and insignificant results for the full sample 
social and environmental scores and all three scores for LME, positive and insignificant 
for full sample corporate governance and social and environmental scores and 
significantly positive for the governance in the CMEs. Clearly, it is difficult to draw a 
robust conclusion regarding the impact of investment institutions block holdings.  
 
It should be noted that there are only 911 firms identified as having institutional block 
holdings in the CMEs and 6,107 in the LMEs. Even so apparently robust results have 
been found with government and pension block holdings even where the numbers of 
firms so identified is relatively low. Of course the results show some instability between 
the regression models for institutional block holding results. This might be expected 
when there is non-linearity in the relationship i.e. the first 10 percent having a 
significantly higher or lower influence than higher bands of 10 percent. When the 
underlying relationships are non-linear we may well expect traditional regression models 
to struggle to produce robust results. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
This paper reports the results of an analysis of 19,360 firm years drawn from 2002-2010 
and from 56 different countries and assumes that the scores of environmental, social and 
governance performance reflect underlying commitment to ESG. They measure 
dimensions of considerable importance to climate change, social inequalities and poor 
governance of commercial and financial firms. Using a variety of estimation techniques 
the results robustly suggest that government block-holdings and higher levels of debt are 
positively associated with environmental, social and governance performance. The results 
are also strongly consistent with entrenched equity holders, be they employees/family or 
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corporate cross-holdings, being negatively associated with scores. Although the results 
also suggest that pension fund based block holdings have a negative effect in CMEs the 
result is based on a small sample of firms and the impact will be modest. The results on 
block-holdings held by financial institutions are inconsistent but given the prevalence of 
such block-holdings and the consequent impact of any influence they would have the 
topic is surely worthy of further investigation. 
 
In contrasting the results of conventional linear regression models with those from 
propensity score matching experimental techniques, the paper also adds to the 
refinement of experimental techniques. In five cases, for leverage, corporate cross-
holdings, employee/family holdings, government holdings and pension fund block 
holdings, the results are broadly similar whether based on regression models or 
propensity score matching. However, the results for investment institution block 
holdings differ widely between the two approaches. There is no obvious reason to 
identify either as necessarily preferable, but there is a clear case for not concluding on the 
impact of institutional investment holdings on ESG scores without further work. 
 
 Conventional agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership from control or 
the exploitation of minority shareholdings by entrenched blocks will lead to sub-optimal 
performance – where optimal is assumed to be wealth maximisation. However, where 
the economic system internalises costs but leaves benefits as externalities, as can be 
argued is the case with corporate social responsibility investments, then wealth 
maximisation for equity holders is no longer a uniquely desirable objective. In such 
circumstances we can expect firms to under-invest in ESG, at least from the point of 
view of many non-investor stakeholders. If we assume that better ESG performance is 
desirable then the results presented above suggest how better performance might be 
achieved. Firstly, debt finance, which only requires repayment of interest and principal 
rather than wealth maximisation, might be encouraged as might government equity 
holdings which are also associated with better ESG scores.  Both of these characteristics 
are more common in the CMEs than in LMEs. Secondly, large corporate cross-holdings 
and employee/family ownership are also seen to be associated with poorer ESG 
performance. These characteristics are more prevalent in the CMEs, and whilst it may be 
unrealistic to suggest these equity holdings should be discouraged it is clear that an 
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agency problem, between entrenched equity holders and non-equity stakeholders, may 
exist. The traditional approach to such agency problems is monitoring and contracting. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
           
 SOC ENV CG SEH COR EMP GOV INV PEN OTH 
           
Mean 49.724 49.296 52.026 26.702 8.216 3.388 1.112 11.184 0.760 0.977 
Median 47.610 44.340 59.415 20.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 0.000 0.000 
Std. Dev. 30.829 31.913 30.024 23.276 17.661 10.923 7.271 15.346 2.750 6.209 
Max 98.950 97.170 98.100 100.000 100.000 93.000 91.000 95.000 90.000 97.000 
Min 3.300 8.800 1.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           
 LEV ROE FMB SOC,I SOC,C ENV,I ENV,C GOV,I GOV,C  
           
Mean 5.622 5.519 5.580 49.464 49.586 49.009 49.111 51.902 51.790  
Median 6.000 6.000 6.000 48.026 43.955 47.640 45.770 50.423 62.206  
Std. Dev. 2.795 2.812 2.899 5.032 11.413 9.267 12.153 4.086 23.048  
Max 10.000 10.000 10.000 58.113 85.679 65.862 76.332 60.357 74.350  
Min 1.000 1.000 1.000 24.998 12.095 21.328 12.417 25.634 3.432  
           
The descriptive statistics refer to the full test sample of 19,360 firm/years drawn from 2002-2010. The sample is derived from 20,146 firm/years for 
which ASSET4 had available ESG scores, 19,588 from the ASSET4 sample for which Worldscope provided a breakdown of strategic equity holdings 
and 19,588 for which Worldscope provided financial data. SOC, ENV and CG are the ASSET4 scores for social, environmental and governance 
performance, ranging from 0 to 100, SEH is the strategic equity holding percentage and COR, EMP, GOV< INV, PEN and OTH the segmentation 
of SEH into corporate, employee/family, government, investment institution, pension funds and other. LEV, ROE and FMB are deciles estimated 
from the full sample for leverage, measured as total debt/(equity + total debt), return on equity, measured as net income over equity, and firm market 
to book, measured as market value of equity plus total debt over book value of equity plus total debt. The distribution of the underlying measures on 
which the deciles were based is given in the appendix. SOC,I though GOV,C are the mean industry and country measures of the social environmental 
and governance variables respectively. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix For All Variables Used In The Regression Models. 
           
Panel 1.          
 SOC ENV CG SEH COR EMP GOV INV PEN OTH 
SOC 1.000          
ENV 0.749 1.000         
CG 0.302 0.141 1.000        
SEH -0.050 -0.112 -0.120 1.000       
COR 0.003 0.008 -0.292 0.525 1.000      
EMP -0.052 -0.068 -0.145 0.301 -0.077 1.000     
GOV 0.101 0.083 -0.046 0.196 -0.035 -0.041 1.000    
INV -0.100 -0.164 0.298 0.421 -0.241 -0.121 -0.095 1.000   
PEN -0.038 -0.059 0.064 0.245 -0.082 -0.055 -0.020 0.313 1.000  
OTH 0.027 0.004 -0.078 0.174 -0.022 -0.031 -0.005 -0.078 -0.027 1.000 
LEV 0.129 0.114 0.039 -0.018 -0.021 -0.031 0.026 -0.001 0.010 0.011 
ROE 0.117 0.022 0.116 0.066 0.032 0.049 0.026 -0.002 0.024 0.021 
FMB 0.086 -0.012 0.226 0.074 -0.067 0.062 -0.049 0.151 0.017 -0.015 
SOC,I 0.164 0.272 -0.003 -0.016 0.005 -0.014 0.054 -0.035 -0.024 -0.010 
SOC,C 0.379 0.307 -0.009 0.105 0.082 0.130 0.049 -0.097 -0.016 0.087 
ENV,I 0.151 0.291 -0.018 -0.038 0.000 -0.024 0.040 -0.044 -0.024 -0.025 
ENV,C 0.299 0.386 -0.341 -0.035 0.093 0.093 0.019 -0.251 -0.082 0.062 
GOV,I 0.000 -0.031 0.137 0.008 -0.034 -0.042 0.014 0.068 0.032 0.013 
GOV,C -0.009 -0.173 0.769 -0.014 -0.310 -0.072 -0.097 0.421 0.134 -0.070 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix For All Variables Used In The Regression Models. 
           
Panel 2.          
 LEV ROE FMB SOC,I SOC,C ENV,I ENV,C GOV,I GOV,C  
LEV 1.000          
ROE -0.040 1.000         
FMb -0.211 0.428 1.000        
SOC,I -0.042 0.043 0.057 1.000       
SOC,C 0.123 0.092 0.203 0.071 1.000      
ENV,I -0.051 0.009 0.021 0.932 0.064 1.000     
ENV,C 0.073 -0.048 0.039 0.112 0.792 0.124 1.000    
GOV,I -0.174 0.017 0.098 0.001 -0.076 -0.099 -0.138 1.000   
GOV,C 0.003 0.108 0.290 -0.073 -0.016 -0.094 -0.446 0.142 1.000  
           
This table contains the spearman correlation for all variables for the full sample. Variable definitions are as given in table 1. 
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Table 3. Results for Strategic Holdings and Leverage 
 ALL LME CME 
 SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG 
INT -47.68 -42.48 -14.33 -41.12 -40.44 -9.600 -54.71 -46.60 -20.16 
 (8.18) (14.02) (3.15) (5.39) (9.60) (1.45) (7.48) (7.23) (4.08) 
SEH -0.118 -0.124 -0.144 -0.159 -0.158 -0.151 -0.0494 -0.0644 -0.148 
 (6.44) (8.07) (8.13) (5.15) (6.93) (3.79) (1.97) (2.47) (6.86) 
LEV 0.999 1.091 0.471 0.987 1.104 0.430 0.969 0.879 0.471 
 (6.34) (5.94) (4.03) (5.99) (5.42) (3.47) (3.21) (3.01) (2.88) 
ROE 0.996 0.662 0.434 1.230 0.798 0.483 0.595 0.665 0.298 
 (6.55) (3.23) (4.30) (7.63) (3.65) (4.81) (1.70) (1.86) (0.99) 
FMB -0.0881 -0.315 0.0379 0.255 -0.166 0.225 -0.765 -1.268 -0.367 
 (0.50) (1.73) (0.27) (1.04) (0.67) (1.60) (2.37) (3.24) (1.80) 
I 0.842 0.859 0.268 0.702 0.741 0.238 1.050 1.026 0.402 
 (8.00) (18.14) (3.92) (5.24) (11.81) (2.69) (8.23) (13.96) (4.24) 
C 0.974 0.915 0.985 0.933 0.989 0.922 0.970 0.899 1.037 
 (19.46) (17.78) (42.86) (9.84) (11.52) (18.38) (15.62) (9.74) (15.70) 
          
N 19360 19360 19360 11670 11670 11670 7690 7690 7690 
adj. R-sq 0.185 0.229 0.607 0.162 0.161 0.325 0.181 0.193 0.440 
Equation 1a: Scoreit = a0 + a1SEHit + a2LEVit + a3ROEit + a4FMBit + a5Cit + a6Iit + eit 
The equation is estimated using OLS on a pooled cross-section and time-series with standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and by year (Petersen, 2009). 
The absolute value of t-statistics are in brackets and coefficients and t-statistics representing significance at 0.05 or less are in bold. The variables are as defined in 
table 1 where Scoreit represents the different measures of social (SOC), environmental (ENV) and governance (CG), INT is the intercept, SEH strategic equity 
holding, LEV deciles of total debt over total debt plus equity, ROE deciles of net income over equity, FMB market value of equity plus total debt over book value 
of equity plus total debt and I and C the industry and country averages for the score in question. ALL is the full sample and LME and CME the samples for liberal 
market economies and coordinated market economies respectively. 
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Table 4. Results for Critical Values of Strategic and Debt Holdings 
 ALL LME CME 
 SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG 
INT -43.71 -37.93 -10.59 -39.40 -38.08 -7.806 -50.35 -42.63 -15.41 
 (7.90) (13.70) (2.26) (5.47) (9.54) (1.46) (7.06) (7.06) (3.04) 
D_SEH -5.196 -5.282 -5.534 -5.935 -5.507 -5.654 -3.385 -4.339 -5.726 
 (7.08) (7.62) (9.23) (7.49) (7.25) (8.08) (2.79) (3.50) (5.74) 
D_LEV 2.713 3.017 1.300 2.509 2.471 1.180 2.713 2.971 1.252 
 (2.87) (3.07) (2.18) (2.46) (2.16) (1.81) (1.71) (1.98) (1.35) 
ROE 1.014 0.689 0.424 1.251 0.837 0.480 0.697 0.793 0.307 
 (6.38) (3.21) (4.16) (7.98) (3.81) (5.02) (1.99) (2.19) (1.00) 
FMB -0.269 -0.494 -0.0553 0.0267 -0.448 0.160 -1.025 -1.482 -0.519 
 (1.60) (2.80) (0.43) (0.12) (1.95) (1.23) (3.29) (3.93) (2.64) 
I 0.836 0.855 0.222 0.714 0.738 0.199 1.036 1.026 0.343 
 (8.03) (17.80) (3.11) (5.47) (11.88) (2.26) (8.05) (13.98) (3.51) 
C 1.002 0.936 0.992 0.986 1.065 0.945 1.009 0.914 1.041 
 (20.27) (17.95) (50.16) (10.69) (12.47) (23.80) (16.05) (9.92) (15.43) 
          
N 19360 19360 19360 11670 11670 11670 7690 7690 7690 
adj. R-sq 0.178 0.221 0.602 0.150 0.147 0.316 0.178 0.191 0.432 
Equation 1a: Scoreit = a0 + a1D_SEHit + a2D_LEVit + a ROEit + a4FMBit + a5Cit + a6Iit + eit 
The equation is estimated using OLS on a pooled cross-section and time-series with standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and by year (Petersen, 2009). 
The absolute value of t-statistics are in brackets and coefficients and t-statistics representing significance at 0.05 or less are in bold. The variables are as defined in 
table 1 where Scoreit represents the different measures of social (SOC), environmental (ENV) and governance (CG), INT is the intercept, D_SEH is a zero-one 
dummy where one represents strategic equity holdings greater than 20%, D_LEV is a zero-one dummy where one representes values of LEV falling in the top 20% 
of the sample, ROE deciles of net income over equity, FMB market value of equity plus total debt over book value of equity plus total debt and I and C the 
industry and country averages for the score in question. ALL is the full sample and LME and CME the samples for liberal market economies and coordinated 
market economies. 
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Table 5. Results for Categories of Strategic Holdings and Leverage 
 ALL LME CME 
 SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG 
INT -45.44 -41.09 -13.01 -40.74 -40.38 -7.364 -51.96 -46.44 -17.77 
 (8.05) (13.54) (3.08) (5.52) (9.74) (1.24) (7.19) (6.87) (3.67) 
COR -0.0961 -0.0953 -0.138 -0.124 -0.107 -0.205 -0.0468 -0.0494 -0.115 
 (4.43) (4.63) (8.40) (3.38) (3.01) (6.53) (1.65) (1.71) (5.13) 
EMP -0.313 -0.313 -0.288 -0.428 -0.386 -0.338 -0.207 -0.232 -0.264 
 (9.94) (8.99) (10.76) (10.85) (10.31) (9.23) (4.73) (4.53) (7.06) 
GOV 0.244 0.209 0.0523 0.255 0.241 0.126 0.267 0.229 -0.00155 
 (6.15) (5.97) (1.38) (2.66) (3.65) (2.42) (5.64) (5.11) (0.04) 
INV -0.156 -0.174 -0.0781 -0.214 -0.234 -0.0870 -0.0218 -0.0248 -0.00999 
 (3.45) (5.09) (2.01) (3.92) (5.12) (1.76) (0.31) (0.36) (0.17) 
PEN -0.194 -0.125 -0.432 0.125 0.174 -0.393 -0.644 -0.540 -0.477 
 (1.56) (1.13) (3.86) (0.84) (0.82) (3.36) (3.24) (2.94) (3.01) 
OTH -0.0795 -0.127 -0.179 -0.184 -0.207 -0.294 0.00433 -0.0504 -0.138 
 (1.64) (2.33) (4.99) (2.47) (3.13) (3.47) (0.07) (0.71) (2.64) 
LEV 0.982 1.079 0.443 0.956 1.090 0.384 0.915 0.837 0.433 
 (6.26) (5.96) (3.82) (5.84) (5.34) (3.25) (3.01) (2.84) (2.49) 
ROE 0.941 0.598 0.458 1.203 0.756 0.496 0.554 0.632 0.287 
 (6.19) (3.00) (4.55) (7.51) (3.47) (5.10) (1.60) (1.78) (0.96) 
FMB 0.0583 -0.165 0.0528 0.283 -0.119 0.229 -0.622 -1.131 -0.287 
 (0.34) (0.94) (0.41) (1.14) (0.46) (1.67) (1.89) (2.83) (1.39) 
I 0.800 0.840 0.247 0.674 0.726 0.238 0.991 1.007 0.344 
 (7.83) (17.81) (3.74) (5.16) (11.68) (2.73) (7.75) (13.94) (3.76) 
C 0.970 0.907 0.972 0.974 1.026 0.886 0.975 0.910 1.032 
 (19.92) (16.98) (55.87) (10.73) (12.25) (19.44) (15.99) (9.18) (15.95) 
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N 19360 19360 19360 11670 11670 11670 7690 7690 7690 
adj. R-sq 0.198 0.241 0.612 0.177 0.175 0.338 0.196 0.207 0.445 
Equation 1b. Scoreit = a0 + a11CORit + a12EMPit + a13GOVit + a14INVit + a15PENit + a16OTHit +… 
a2LEVit + a3ROEit + a4TQit + a5CMit + a6IMit + eit 
The equation is estimated using OLS on a pooled cross-section and time-series with standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and by year (Petersen, 2009). 
The absolute value of t-statistics are in brackets and coefficients and t-statistics representing significance at 0.05 or less are in bold. The variables are as defined in 
table 3 except that the strategic equity holding (SEH) variable is replaced with its six components, corporate holdings (COR), employee/family holdings (EMP), 
government holdings (GOV), investment institutions’ holdings (INV), pension fund holdings (PEN) and other strategic equity holdings (OTH). ALL is the full 
sample and LME and CME the samples for liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. 
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Table 6. Results for Critical Values of Holding by Category plus Leverage 
 ALL LME CME 
 SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG 
INT -41.65 -37.54 -8.449 -38.70 -38.10 -5.661 -47.16 -42.31 -11.40 
 (7.80) (13.59) (1.89) (5.59) (9.69) (1.04) (6.74) (6.90) (2.31) 
D_COR -4.696 -4.856 -4.395 -5.274 -4.577 -6.741 -3.373 -3.985 -3.246 
 (4.45) (4.69) (6.18) (3.47) (2.93) (5.15) (2.52) (3.02) (3.45) 
D_EMP -11.55 -11.92 -8.710 -12.70 -11.91 -8.936 -9.623 -11.27 -8.513 
 (10.31) (8.71) (9.60) (8.43) (7.38) (7.45) (5.48) (5.72) (5.49) 
D_GOV 11.91 11.13 4.875 12.60 12.45 6.015 12.26 11.11 3.680 
 (6.93) (7.46) (3.17) (3.46) (4.11) (2.17) (5.49) (5.47) (1.94) 
D_INV -3.372 -3.321 -1.661 -5.003 -5.186 -2.442 0.693 0.549 1.160 
 (4.11) (4.52) (3.08) (5.92) (6.95) (3.36) (0.51) (0.38) (0.92) 
D_PEN -10.56 -7.475 -8.385 -5.798 -3.913 -9.074 -14.79 -11.22 -8.353 
 (2.87) (2.24) (2.44) (1.04) (0.83) (1.69) (3.63) (2.99) (2.50) 
D_OTH -1.926 -4.994 -3.681 -5.243 -6.257 -7.387 0.743 -3.535 -1.851 
 (0.93) (2.32) (2.52) (1.56) (2.40) (2.43) (0.29) (1.19) (0.80) 
D_LEV 2.558 2.860 1.193 2.276 2.290 0.930 2.671 2.989 1.218 
 (2.82) (3.08) (2.06) (2.32) (2.13) (1.44) (1.71) (2.06) (1.31) 
ROE 0.964 0.651 0.411 1.241 0.821 0.479 0.591 0.684 0.230 
 (5.84) (3.03) (3.73) (8.03) (3.74) (4.86) (1.71) (1.92) (0.76) 
FMB -0.169 -0.405 -0.0194 0.0153 -0.455 0.176 -0.824 -1.276 -0.418 
 (1.07) (2.51) (0.15) (0.07) (2.02) (1.35) (2.58) (3.29) (2.04) 
I 0.793 0.834 0.186 0.682 0.725 0.180 0.978 1.002 0.260 
 (7.63) (17.62) (2.69) (5.28) (11.73) (2.05) (7.64) (14.00) (2.71) 
C 1.010 0.957 0.979 1.036 1.119 0.928 0.999 0.928 1.020 
 (21.03) (17.92) (60.05) (11.38) (12.92) (22.35) (16.98) (9.75) (15.10) 
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N 19360 19360 19360 11670 11670 11670 7690 7690 7690 
adj. R-sq 0.192 0.234 0.605 0.162 0.158 0.322 0.196 0.211 0.437 
Equation 1b: Scoreit = a0 + a11D_CORit + a12D_EMPit + a13D_GOVit + a14D_INVit + a15D_PENit + a16D_OTHit +… 
a2D_LEVit + a3ROEit + a4TQit + a5CMit + a6IMit + eit 
The equation is estimated using OLS on a pooled cross-section and time-series with standard errors adjusted for clustering by firm and by year (Petersen, 2009). 
The absolute value of t-statistics are in brackets and coefficients and t-statistics representing significance at 0.05 or less are in bold. The variables are as defined in 
table 4 except that the variables identifying the six components of strategic equity holdings are zero-one dummies where one represents an strategic equity holding 
greater than 10% for corporate holdings (D_COR), employee/family holdings (D_EMP), government holdings (D_GOV), investment institutions’ holdings 
(D_INV), pension fund holdings (D_PEN) and other strategic equity holdings (D_OTH). ALL is the full sample and LME and CME the samples for liberal market 
economies and coordinated market economies. 
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Table 7. Propensity Score Matching Results For Critical Values 
  All LME CME 
  SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG SOC ENV CG 
           
D_SEH ATT -5.502 -5.968 -1.461 -2.182 -1.055 3.603 -1.711 -5.034 -5.136 
 T (6.65) (6.96) (1.85) (1.69) (0.79) (3.87)1 (1.40)2 (4.20) (4.90) 
D_COR ATT -2.710 -3.695 -3.618 -2.103 -0.401 -5.284 -2.805 -4.437 -2.638 
 T (2.89) (3.90) (4.23) (1.48) (0.29) (4.04) (2.38) (3.83) (2.81) 
D_EMP ATT -10.284 -10.432 -9.351 -11.399 -9.914 -8.058 -10.122 -11.144 -9.452 
 T (9.54) (9.47) (9.12) (8.26) (7.02) (6.72) (6.38) (7.00) (7.05) 
D_GOV ATT 16.294 16.847 4.887 20.092 18.411 11.881 13.625 14.388 3.146 
 T (7.75) (7.75) (2.54) (4.69) (4.56) (3.13) (6.04) (6.07) (1.40) 
D_INV ATT -2.390 -1.944 1.064 -2.562 -1.814 -0.445 2.163 1.298 6.844 
 T (1.49) (1.15) (0.72)2 (1.44) (0.97) (0.35) (1.37) (0.83) (5.09) 
D_PEN ATT -7.192 -7.289 -8.087 6.480 0.679 -3.208 -20.844 -17.107 -11.452 
 T (2.06) (2.11) (2.50) (1.37) (0.14) (0.78) (4.35) (3.60) (2.70) 
D_OTH ATT -2.488 -5.132 -6.649 -4.129 -6.070 -6.596 2.030 -2.687 -2.890 
 T (1.22) (2.46) (3.65) (1.27) (1.86)2 (2.28) (0.80) (1.03)2 (1.42)2 
D_LEV ATT 5.140 6.155 1.711 4.931 5.787 2.146 4.398 6.351 2.178 
 T (6.08) (7.04) (2.09) (4.85) (5.55) (2.74) (3.13) (4.56) (1.96) 
           
Equation 2: TRTit = b0 +b2LEVit + b3ROEit + b4FMBit + Σy.YRit + Σc.COit + Σi.INDit + eit 
The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) where treatment is defined as strategic equity holdings greater than 20% (D_SEH), and 
strategic equity holdings of greater than 10% for each of the components of SEH: (D_COR), employee/family holdings (D_EMP), government holdings 
(D_GOV), investment institutions’ holdings (D_INV), pension fund holdings (D_PEN) and other strategic equity holdings (D_OTH). The treated firms are 
matched with their closest untreated neighbour on the basis of the probability of treated estimated from the probit model specified in equation 2. Absolute values 
of the t-statistics are give in brackets and ATT estimates and t-statistics signifying statistical significance less than 0.05 are shown in bold. The treatment is assessed 
agains the three ESG scores, social (SOC), environmental (ENV) and governance (CG) for the full sample and sub-samples restricted to liberal market economies 
(LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). 1 signifies that the significant result is not confirmed when using bootstrapping techniques. 2 signifies that 
bootstrapping returns a statistically significant result where as the standard technique does not. 
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Appendix 1. ESG Scores, Strategic Equity Holdings and Leverage by Industry. 
 N SOC ENV CG SEH LEV 
UNCLASS 12 25.00 21.33 25.63 40.33 5.83 
BASIC IND. 2179 51.77 57.22 50.46 23.96 5.51 
CAPITAL GOODS 2446 56.08 63.75 48.97 24.27 5.80 
CONSUMER DUR. 613 57.59 66.42 47.70 26.38 4.75 
CON. NON-DUR 1350 54.27 51.31 51.75 27.81 6.43 
CONSUMER SER. 2798 46.14 40.27 50.48 29.91 6.31 
ENERGY 1364 48.24 46.20 60.94 28.02 5.55 
FINANCE 4124 43.27 38.88 50.48 25.71 4.47 
HEALTH CARE 1098 51.14 45.60 56.09 28.01 6.99 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 1231 58.36 59.26 55.01 28.86 4.80 
TECHNOLOGY 1518 47.47 48.09 58.92 25.52 6.53 
TRANSPORT 627 48.54 50.17 42.69 29.11 4.82 
Total 19360 49.72 49.30 52.03 26.70 5.58 
This table shows the distribution of observations and mean social (SOC), environmental (ENV) 
and governance (CG) scores, strategic equity holdings (SEH) and leverage deciles (LEV) across 
basic industry groups. 
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Appendix 2. ESG Scores, Strategic Equity Holdings and Leverage by Country. 
COUNTRY N SOC ENV CG SEH LEV 
AUSTRALIA 902 40.74 41.71 58.66 22.44 5.01 
AUSTRIA 141 48.72 49.29 27.73 38.61 4.16 
BELGIUM 193 48.13 52.99 44.66 39.54 4.18 
BRAZIL 115 69.53 56.06 25.94 38.20 5.27 
CANADA 1041 34.64 34.85 69.64 19.04 4.90 
CHILE 33 48.03 43.87 10.92 57.33 5.42 
CHINA 126 35.69 32.10 22.01 49.21 4.76 
COLOMBIA 8 43.27 36.62 28.90 48.38 5.38 
CYPRUS 3 43.79 24.65 53.06 0.00 2.00 
CZECH REP. 12 64.23 53.51 29.98 57.17 5.33 
DENMARK 173 46.18 51.23 26.81 30.27 5.23 
DUBAI 4 25.81 36.49 20.35 50.00 4.00 
EGYPT 6 25.28 12.42 10.66 26.33 5.67 
FINLAND 193 64.76 70.68 51.53 21.28 5.11 
FRANCE 673 75.18 74.33 50.37 34.27 4.60 
GERMANY 553 66.20 66.01 30.49 29.62 4.51 
GREECE 174 51.05 48.54 19.20 30.29 4.47 
HONG KONG 482 36.30 33.30 25.32 47.71 5.08 
HUNGARY 9 85.68 76.33 45.30 42.56 3.00 
ICELAND 3 55.58 27.59 26.68 51.33 3.00 
INDIA 103 62.47 53.23 26.87 48.15 5.94 
INDONESIA 31 60.95 39.17 22.46 35.00 7.71 
IRELAND 116 41.20 41.93 60.11 24.87 4.72 
ISRAEL 31 30.49 31.06 27.04 29.68 5.55 
ITALY 360 60.81 49.41 34.23 41.74 3.96 
JAPAN 2631 43.95 60.89 11.50 14.95 4.03 
JORDAN 2 63.84 57.73 20.55 34.00 2.50 
KAZAKHSTAN 2 34.63 18.55 55.66 0.00 4.00 
KUWAIT 8 29.72 14.68 3.37 26.25 5.13 
LUXEMBOURG 9 53.16 44.27 38.56 23.56 7.00 
MALAYSIA 63 44.41 37.54 37.99 41.46 4.97 
MEXICO 54 54.65 48.90 19.40 24.61 4.56 
MOROCCO 5 63.68 20.43 3.43 45.40 7.00 
NETHERLANDS 248 75.31 66.77 62.65 17.81 4.77 
NEW ZEALAND 64 42.56 47.08 51.13 21.16 4.56 
NORWAY 173 59.59 55.96 50.90 33.50 5.49 
OMAN 2 12.10 15.99 5.33 0.00 3.50 
PERU 4 64.28 35.72 46.98 60.00 8.50 
PHILIPPINES 14 39.75 35.73 24.16 42.86 5.64 
POLAND 34 33.34 27.93 14.71 57.24 4.15 
PORTUGAL 85 75.21 64.48 43.35 54.39 4.29 
QATAR 4 25.85 19.82 4.35 60.00 7.00 
RUSSIA 77 48.76 38.65 21.18 51.05 4.35 
SAUDI ARABIA 11 23.65 28.44 5.41 64.82 5.91 
SINGAPORE 265 34.24 32.55 35.65 38.37 4.56 
SOUTH AFRICA 76 75.21 63.56 60.46 35.76 5.43 
SOUTH KOREA 130 54.23 61.81 16.27 35.41 4.38 
SPAIN 344 73.38 67.60 44.21 43.62 4.94 
SRI LANKA 1 50.79 47.34 23.26 0.00 5.00 
SWEDEN 400 61.42 62.92 49.19 26.61 4.71 
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SWITZERLAND 420 57.10 58.80 49.46 25.81 5.60 
TAIWAN 103 38.68 47.61 12.06 13.08 5.26 
THAILAND 32 52.39 42.99 45.44 27.72 5.78 
TURKEY 41 47.51 38.17 12.39 53.44 4.46 
UK 2314 63.27 58.73 68.10 26.75 9.92 
USA 6259 43.24 38.57 72.91 25.45 5.58 
Total 19360 49.72 49.30 52.03 26.70 5.58 
This table shows the distribution of observations and mean social (SOC), environmental (ENV) 
and governance (CG) scores, strategic equity holdings (SEH) and leverage deciles (LEV) across 
countries. Those countries classified as liberal market economies are in italics. The allocation to 
LME or CME is initially based on equity market capitalisation to GDP and origin of the legal 
system. Common law countries with higher than median MC/GDP are designated LME. For all 
large economies, and hence substantial samples, this corresponds to the Hall and Soskice (2001) 
classification. It is assumed to hold for smaller economies. In a few instances the decision rules did 
not correspond and a judgement allocation was made. For example the Indian legal system is 
common law but it has a relatively small equity market. These decisions only affect a few small 
samples and the results are not noticeably changed if countries with small samples (less than 100 
firm/years) are excluded. 
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Appendix 3. Distribution of Leverage, Return on Equity and Firm Market to Book across 
Deciles. 
    
 LEV ROE FMB 
 mean median mean Median mean median 
Decile       
1.000 -0.054 0.000 -0.667 -0.224 -7.824 0.803 
2.000 0.067 0.067 0.001 0.007 1.003 1.006 
3.000 0.182 0.185 0.051 0.052 1.147 1.146 
4.000 0.268 0.269 0.082 0.082 1.310 1.310 
5.000 0.342 0.343 0.109 0.109 1.518 1.514 
6.000 0.411 0.411 0.136 0.136 1.809 1.802 
7.000 0.485 0.484 0.166 0.166 2.249 2.239 
8.000 0.575 0.574 0.206 0.205 3.090 3.052 
9.000 0.691 0.689 0.271 0.267 6.644 5.484 
10.000 0.990 0.875 1.086 0.451 283.218 134.193 
Average 0.408 0.384 0.143 0.124 34.647 1.668 
       
LEV, ROE and FMB are used in the regression models as deciles estimated from the full 
sample for leverage, measured as total debt/(equity + total debt), return on equity, 
measured as net income over equity, and firm market to book, measured as market value 
of equity plus total debt over book value of equity plus total debt. The table shows the 
distribution of the underlying values. 
 
